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1  Statement of Topic 
 
Since Porter first proposed in his 1991 paper entitled America’s Green Strategy that 
environmental regulation would lead to innovation, and thus lead to a competitive 
advantage for businesses, there has been much debate over whether this relationship 
holds true.  Up until this point there has been research, both theoretical and empirical, to 
support both sides of the argument with important consequences for policy makers.  In 
the face of serious global environmental problems, including unprecedented climate 
change and a global economy that has not yet turned its attention to addressing these 
issues, political leaders are struggling to draft policy that will successfully encourage the 
private sector to reduce its environmental impact without damaging profits or restricting 
growth. 
 
This paper will review prior research to support the notion that innovation does in fact 
lead to a competitive advantage for business, and that this competitive advantage is 
translated into increased profitability and productivity.  Though the body of work 
reviewed here will by no means unequivocally prove that this relationship always holds 
true in real-world markets, it will provide a convincing argument that fostering 
innovation will likely have positive economic affects.  Building off this assumption, this 
paper will then focus specifically on examining the relationship between environmental 
regulation and innovation in more detail.  This paper looks to answer the question: Under 
what conditions will environmental regulation cause firms to begin choosing to innovate 
technologically rather than simply to meet regulation with compliance?  This question 
will be answered in two ways: 
 
First, this paper will present various case studies focusing on companies that have met 
environmental regulation with innovation.  Using these case studies, a framework will be 
developed which identifies conditions under which environmental regulation will tend to 
foster innovation.  For the purposes of this paper, the term innovation can be seen as 
synonymous with research and development (R&D), since R&D is the principal method 
that a firm uses to achieve proprietary innovation. 
 
Second, in light of this framework a mechanism will be identified in order to model the 
successful innovation that the firms discussed in this paper have enjoyed.  Drawing from 
examples in the case studies, the model will look to specifically analyze situations in 
which firms are made better off by their innovation decisions.  This analysis will consider 
the factors that influence a firm’s decision to innovate in the face of regulation, rather 
than to merely comply with environmental regulation by implementing so-called “end-of-
pipe” solutions, as well as provide insight as to why these firms would not choose to 
undertake such projects without the help of environmental regulation. 
 
Together with the framework, this model will provide a more complete understanding of 
the conditions under which environmental regulation can successfully induce innovation 
in firms.  By fostering innovation, such environmental regulation will not merely have a 
reduced chance of impairing firm performance, but more importantly will have an 
increased chance of actually making firms more profitable and more competitive. 
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The so-called Porter Hypothesis can be more completely summed up as follows: 
  
 “Appropriately planned environmental regulations will stimulate technological 
 innovation, leading to reductions in expenses and improvements in quality.  As a 
 result,  domestic businesses may attain a superior competitive position in the 
 international marketplace, and industrial productivity may increase as well” 
 (Friedman 2008, p. 272). 
 
As stated, there are in fact two distinct relationships that are proposed in the Porter 
Hypothesis: (1) the positive relationship between environmental regulation and 
innovation, and (2) the positive relationship between innovation and competitive 
position/industrial productivity.  Therefore, it is necessary to understand the factors that 
influence both of these relationships in order to fully understand how Porter’s Hypothesis 
can properly inform environmental policy. 
 
2.2 The Relationship between Environmental Regulation and Innovation 
 
Though Porter does not explore the relationship between regulation and innovation in 
depth, he does propose various ways in which environmental regulation could 
theoretically influence innovation decisions.  He proposes that environmental regulations 
can: 
  
1. “Signal companies about resource inefficiencies & potential technological improvements.” 
2. “Reduce uncertainty that investments to address the environment will be valuable.” 
3. “Overcome organizational inertia, foster creative thinking and mitigate agency  problems.” 
4. “Level the transitional playing field.” (Porter and van der Linde 1995, pp. 99-100) 
 
Given the relative lack research/analysis that is available regarding the regulation-
innovation relationship, there is much insight to be gained into the practicality of using 
the Porter Hypothesis to influence policy making by studying innovation decisions.  
Furthermore, if the relationship between environmental regulation and innovation 
decision can be better understood then the Porter Hypothesis will gather new strength in 
environmental regulation debates moving forward. 
 
2.3 The Relationship between Innovation and Competitive Advantage/Industrial 
Productivity 
 
In the context of Porter’s original research, the relationship between innovation and 
competitive advantage can be seen as the starting point of the Porter Hypothesis.  In 
coming up with this hypothesis he worked backwards, beginning with a measurable 
observation and then proposing a theoretical mechanism that would explain how these 
results could be achieved.  In his book The Competitive Advantage of Nations Porter 
notices that nations with the most rigorous environmental requirements often lead in 
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exports of affected products (Porter 1990).  One of his most powerful examples is the 
observation that both Japan and Germany, countries who have enacted stricter 
environmental regulations than the United States, had surpassed the U.S. in GNP growth 
and rates of productivity growth during periods of more stringent regulation (Porter 
1991). 
 
Porter & van der Linde (1995) termed the benefits resulting from environmental 
regulation innovation offsets, and noted that such offsets can occur in products 
(innovation creates better performing products) and in processes (innovation can cause 
higher resource productivity).  In response to this, there has been much additional 
research to verify or refute whether this relationship holds true.  Empirical studies have 
attempted to quantify and measure the competitive advantage or environmental profit that 
firms can achieve through innovation.  However, this research spends little time 
exploring the relationship between regulation and innovation itself. 
 




The current literature focusing on the debate surrounding the Porter Hypothesis takes the 
form of both empirical analysis and formal models, focusing on the relationship between 
innovation and competitive advantage. The literature attempts to shed light on this 
relationship by determining whether firms gain a competitive advantage through 
innovation and by attempting to measure or quantify any environmental profit that firms 
gain by innovating.  Although this paper will not attempt to follow in the footsteps of this 
literature, it is nevertheless a worthwhile exercise to review the current body of work in 
order to provide the proper context for this paper. 
 
In the case of empirical studies, a statistical approach is taken to either confirm or deny 
the Porter Hypothesis based on data collected concerning the competitiveness of firms 
after facing environmental regulation.  Because these studies focus on analyzing the 
relationship between innovation and competitive advantage, only studies which support 
the Porter Hypothesis are presented here.  Their purpose is to lend credence to the 
assumption that innovation will likely lead to a competitive advantage for firms, so that 
this paper may focus on exploring the relationship between regulation and innovation in 
more detail.  
 
In the case of formal models, theoretical knowledge about the Porter Hypothesis is 
explored using models to explain the mechanisms by which his hypothesis is presumed to 
operate.  These models serve either to support or refute the Porter Hypothesis, as well as 
serve to qualify certain assumptions or mechanisms of how the model functions.  In this 
review, models serving both purposes will be considered as important sources of analysis 
on the Porter Hypothesis as a whole, as well as important building blocks for a similar 
model to be developed that will better explain the relationship between environmental 
regulation and innovation decisions. 
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Because this paper will attempt to provide a new model aimed at understanding the 
relationship between environmental regulation and innovation (specifically R&D), there 
is special attention paid to past research in this area.  This paper will not only summarize 
past findings, but also will identify gaps in the literature and explain how this paper will 
differ in its approach to understanding the relationship between regulation and 
innovation. 
 
3.2 Empirical Analysis of the Porter Hypothesis   
 
Though Porter & van der Linde (1995) did not rely on empirical analysis in their original 
discussion of the Porter Hypothesis, empirical results are nevertheless an important 
source of information for the debate moving forward.  Namely, empirical evidence has 
been a critical way of linking environmental regulation to competitive advantage, 
however that may be defined, and measuring the costs and/or benefits that firms have 
faced as a result of regulation.  Therefore, consideration of past empirical studies that 
support the Porter Hypothesis is an important step in confirming the practical results of 
the hypothesis as well as in shedding light on concepts that require more study moving 
forward. 
 
Jaffe et al. (1995) review 16 empirical studies on the effects of environmental regulation 
on competitiveness in manufacturing firms, particularly in the U.S.  In their analysis, they 
consider studies that use many different measures of competitiveness, including net 
exports, overall trade flows, and plant location decisions.  Jaffe et al. (1995) are able to 
conclude that “there is relatively little evidence to support the hypothesis that 
environmental regulations have had a large adverse effect on competitiveness, however 
that elusive term is defined” (Jaffe et al. 1995, p. 157).  By concluding that firms are not 
as adversely affected as previously expected, this study lends support to the Porter 
Hypothesis and indicates that there is a mechanism through which firms improve their 
performance when faced with environmental regulation. 
 
Similarly, Mulatu et al. (2001) provide meta-analysis of 13 studies that analyze the effect 
of environmental regulation on international trade.  Overall, they conclude “that the 
empirical literature does not strongly support the hypothesis, that the effect of 
environmental regulation on competitiveness is negative” (Mulatu et al. 2001, p. 22).  
Again this study lends support to the Porter Hypothesis, and by further examining the 
effects of environmental regulation in international markets Mulatu et al. (2001) explore 
a crucial component of Porter’s original research. 
 
Murty & Kumar (2003) measure the productive efficiency of 92 firms in water-polluting 
industries in India.  By creating indices to measure a firm’s level of compliance as well as 
their level of conservation, the study then compares these levels against the efficiency of 
the firms in order to explore the relationship between environmental regulation and 
technical inefficiency.  Murty and Kumar (2003) find that a firm’s higher level of 
compliance as well as higher level of conservation lead to lower technical inefficiency of 
the firm, which again supports the Porter Hypothesis. 
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3.3 Theoretical Analysis of the Porter Hypothesis 
 
There are several theoretical studies that cast doubt on whether the Porter Hypothesis can 
be used to effectively increase competitive advantage and industrial productivity.  For 
example, Lankoski (2000) analyzes the effects of regulation on vertical product 
differentiation within a duopoly.  In Lankoski’s model, firms are allowed to supply 
products at different levels of environmental performance, with different costs and 
benefits assigned to each, and then face either Bertrand or Cournot competition, deciding 
the price or quantity at which to supply.  The paper concludes that “firms always choose 
to provide distinct levels of environmental performance at the optimum” (Lankoski 2000, 
p. 29), meaning that the environmental performance supplied by the firms on their own 
may not be socially optimal and would thus inspire regulation.  Lankoski (2000) 
interprets these results to mean that the link between regulation & competitiveness is not 
uniform, and that the validity of Porter Hypothesis depends heavily on market dynamics 
that may be different across industries. 
 
Simpson & Bradford III (1996) provide even stronger theoretical evidence that the 
relationship between innovation and competitive advantage does not hold.  Their model 
analyzes domestic and foreign firms competing in Cournot duopoly, in which the 
domestic firm’s government attempts to induce a competitive advantage for the domestic 
firm by instituting an effluent tax.  The firms’ supply decisions are calculated, and 
Simpson & Bradford III (1996) conclude that it is very difficult to impart parameters on 
the model for which an effluent tax imposed by the domestic government makes the 
domestic firm more competitive. 
 
However, Sinclair-Desgagne (1999) proposes that the underlying theory of the Porter 
Hypothesis is consistent because inefficiencies in firms are revealed under stringent 
regulations.  Furthermore, there are many formal models to support this claim, as well as 
to support the relationship between innovation and competitive advantage proposed by 
the Porter Hypothesis. 
 
Xepapadeas & de Zeeuw (1999) show that downsizing and modernization in firms 
subject to stringent environmental regulations increases profitability.  As a result, they are 
able to conclude that environmental regulation has a positive effect on the marginal 
change of profitability and environmental performance simultaneously.  Furthermore,  
Mohr (2002) expands on this study by additionally considering external economies of 
scale in production, allowing productivity to depend on the cumulative experience with a 
technology.  Mohr (2002) again finds that policy can simultaneously increase 
productivity and reduce externalities, and concludes that “Porter’s Hypothesis is a 
plausible outcome if one allows for the possibility of technological change with external 
economies of scale” (Mohr 2002, p. 164). 
 
Finally, Alpay (2001) builds on the Simpson & Bradford III model previously mentioned 
in order to analyze the comparative effects of the government regulation using a tradable 
emissions permit systems versus a straight effluent tax.  Alpay (2001) finds that in this 
model it is much easier for firms to be profitable in the face of regulation, and thus gain a 
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competitive advantage in the international marketplace, because of revenues realized 
from traded permits.  It should be noted, however, that although this finding supports the 
Porter Hypothesis, it also introduces another level of complication to the analysis by 
tying firm performance to the dynamics of a permit market system. 
 
3.4 The Relationship Between Regulation and R&D 
 
There is much previous work exploring the relationship between environmental 
regulation and R&D.  The benefit of exploring this literature is twofold: (1) the results of 
these studies lend support to the theory behind the Porter Hypothesis and thus provide a 
strong foundation for the model in this paper, and (2) analyzing the mechanism outlined 
in these studies will provide context and guidance for the mechanism presented later in 
this paper. 
 
Greaker & Pade (2009) present a study that analyzes the level of carbon dioxide 
emissions taxes.  In their study, Greaker & Pade (2009) acknowledge that setting a higher 
emissions tax today can be a beneficial form of environmental regulation, through its 
influence of innovation, if we have technological change driven by R&D rather than pure 
exogenous technological change.  Given this assumption they develop simulation criteria 
for understanding when setting a high emissions tax today is most beneficial.  They find 
that “these circumstances are (a) ‘a standing on shoulders’ type of knowledge spillover 
and/or (b) weak patent protection” (Greaker & Pade 2009, p. 351).  Their study clearly 
establishes the beneficial link between environmental regulation and innovation, and 
even goes on to clearly identify certain conditions that must be satisfied in order for this 
relationship to hold.  Building off of this established connection, this paper hopes to 
examine specifically how R&D decisions at the firm level are affected by environmental 
regulation.  
 
Ambec & Barla (2001) provide a theoretical foundation of the Porter Hypothesis by 
considering a model in which a division manager implements and manages a new 
production plant, which begins with an initial investment in R&D under the direction of 
the firm’s larger hierarchical authority.  In this study, they consider the outcomes of the 
firm’s project in two scenarios, one without regulation and one with regulation.  Through 
a model of renegotiation, Ambec & Barla (2001) show that environmental regulation 
applies external pressure that is able overcome organizational inertia in order to enhance 
pollution-reducing innovation and increase a firm’s private benefit.  This study provides a 
good preliminary insight into how environmental regulation can influence a firm’s R&D 
decisions.  However, the mechanism through which this regulation influence firm 
behavior (renegotiation) is not in line with the major findings of the case studies to be 
presented in Section 4.  Therefore, though Ambec & Barla’s study serves as an 
encouraging example to support the notion that there is an important link between 
environmental regulation and innovation, this paper will look to identify a different 
mechanism through which the Porter Hypothesis operates. 
 
Popp (2005) outlines a mechanism that is most consistent with the case studies to be 
presented later in this paper.  His study attempts to model the conclusions of the Porter 
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Hypothesis in a way that is consistent with neoclassical economic principals by 
considering the influence that environmental regulation can have on the uncertainty 
inherent to R&D projects.  Popp (2005) calibrates a model of R&D that allows for a 
positive expected value of the project only when regulation is imposed.  Using this model 
it is found that, “between 8 and 24 percent of simulation runs result in R&D that 
increases profits with regulation to levels greater than profits without R&D” (Popp 2005, 
p. 8).  This study clearly identifies uncertainty in R&D as a mechanism by which firms 
can benefit from environmental regulation.  However, the results of this study are limited 
to the decisions of only one firm.  Therefore, in order to more completely understand this 
mechanism it will be necessary to consider the interactions among multiple firms who 





In analyzing the literature above it is clear that, although there is much previous work that 
supports the Porter Hypothesis, a greater understanding of the mechanisms that drive the 
benefits of environmental regulation is needed in order to affect meaningful change in 
regard to policy decisions.  As the following case studies will show, there are many 
success stories resulting from environmental regulation in the past.  Using these case 
studies to identify specific mechanisms for the beneficial effects of environmental 
regulation will fill in the gaps of previous work concerning the Porter Hypothesis and 
should provide a means to develop a more consistent relationship between regulation and 
innovation in the future. 
 




The case studies presented here serve as examples of how various businesses have met 
environmental regulation with technological innovations.  The following examples will 
explore cases in which the decision to innovate has met with great success, as evidenced 
by greater profits or cost reductions, as well as a case in which regulation did not lead to 
enhanced firm performance.  The purpose of exploring both of these scenarios is to gain a 
more complete understanding of the complex interaction between regulation and 
innovation decisions, and thus be able to identify a mechanism through which regulation 
is likely to be successful in benefiting a firm.  Each case study will provide historical 
context for both the affected firm and the imposed regulation, detail the environmental 
regulation imposed and the firms innovation decision, describe the results of this 
innovation decision, and provide analysis of why this regulation was or was not 
successful in benefiting the firm.  From here the following section will synthesize these 
analyses as well as identify and develop a mechanism that accurately reflects the success 





4.2 GE Transportation  
 
Friedman (2008) provides insight into how GE Transportation, maker of locomotives 
located in Erie, PA, is responsible for the city’s trade surplus with China, Mexico, and 
Brazil.  This trade surplus is a result of the company’s Evolution Series diesel locomotive 
(EVO), which sell at approximately $4 million a piece.  According to Friedman (2008) 
GE sells this top of the line locomotive to railroad companies worldwide, including 
Mexico, Brazil, Australia and Kazakhstan, and will have exported 300 to China by the 
end of 2009.  Even though these engines are more expensive than ones produced in the 
countries to which they are being exported, the EVO is coveted for its fuel efficiency and 
reliability, characteristics that are a result of engine innovations that GE Transportation 
undertook in response to stricter emissions standards by the EPA in 2004. 
 
The EPA has a long history of regulating the emissions of locomotives and other 
transportation vehicles.  In 2004 the EPA issued new Tier II standards, which required 
big reductions in both particulates and nitrogen oxide.  GE’s traditional approach to deal 
with this sort of regulation was to meet regulatory compliance by tweaking a engine that 
already met the current standards, and then deal with a tradeoff in variables like fuel 
efficiency, power, or reliability.  But in this case, GE’s chairman, Jeffery Immelt, instead 
encouraged the engineers to start from scratch and build an entirely new engine; in other 
words, he decided to innovate. 
 
The result was a focus on increasing reliability, lowering emissions, and increasing fuel 
efficiency all at the same time with a new design and new materials.  Accordingly, GE 
Transportation was successful in creating the most energy efficient locomotive on the 
market, getting the best fuel mileage per ton pulled, and in creating the locomotive with 
the lowest emissions of CO2, traditional soot particles, and nitrogen oxide.  Friedman 
(2008) reports that the EVO is 5% more fuel efficient than the old model, which 
translates into a savings of approximately 300,000 gallons of fuel over its lifetime.  GE 
Transportation’s President and CEO, John Dineen, admits, “The EPA can be credited 
with instigating the need to drive new technologies into these locomotives” (Friedman 
2008, p. 271). 
 
Jarratt et al. (2003) puts GE success into context with their examination of how 
environmental regulation has become a driver of the design process across the fast paced 
and competitive diesel engine manufacturing industry.  Due to the steady increase in 
emissions standards, they have analyzed how the industry has reacted to meet regulatory 
requirements and have concluded, “Although each successive wave of regulation looks 
exceptionally hard to meet, increased levels of innovation within the industry are ensuring 
that solutions are found. Diesel engine manufacturers have adapted and are now used to 
operating in a legislative environment” (Jarratt et al. 2003, p. 9). 
 
Given that there is an industry wide recognition of the need to innovate as a result of 
increasingly stringent environmental regulation, how then was GE able to achieve such a 
level of differentiation and recognize such success?  The success of GE’s R&D project is 
perhaps more serendipitous than it may at first seem.  Obviously, redesigning a 
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locomotive engine from scratch was a significant investment for GE Transportation and a 
significant risk.  At the time there was no guarantee to the company that they would 
actually benefit from putting in the effort to create a more fuel-efficient locomotive.  
Dineen remarked, “We were not sure the Chinese would be interested in lower emissions, 
but they are” (Friedman 2008, p. 271).  In this case, GE Transportation benefited from 
fact that carbon emissions became an issue for many countries beyond the U.S.  
According to Friedman (2008) in 2008 China overtook the U.S. as the world’s leading 
carbon emitter, and as such China’s government owned railroads became interested in 
buying more fuel-efficient locomotives.  GE Transportation even saw very quick 
adoption rates in international markets that do not have government mandates.  This leads 
to the conclusion that environmental regulation can lead to successful innovation if this 
same regulation is adopted or favored by other countries as well.  Under these 
circumstances, a new market is created for products that meet the new levels of 





Nidumolu et al. (2009) recount how Hewlett-Packard has consistently demonstrated an 
approach of meeting regulation with innovation by viewing compliance as a business 
opportunity.  By better understanding the context in which HP views regulation as an 
economic opportunity, we can better understand general trends and characteristics that 
will lead to positive effects of environmental regulation. 
 
In the 1990’s HP realized that, because the lead it was using in solders is toxic, it was 
very likely that governments would eventually ban lead in solders.  In the following years 
HP developed a solder using an amalgam of tin, silver, and copper, and as a result was 
able to comply with the European Union’s Restriction of Hazardous Substance (RoHS) 
directive, which regulates the use of lead in electronics product, as soon as it took effect 
in 2006, lending the company a significant first mover advantage. In a separate study, 
Eveloy et al. (2005) report, “The cost of implementing the RoHS directive in the EU has 
been estimated to be US$ 20Bn. Intel Corporation’s efforts to remove lead from its chips 
have been estimated to cost the company over US$ 100 million so far” (Eveloy et al. 
2005, p. 884).  So while other companies struggled to switch over to new technologies as 
a result of the ban on lead, HP’s use of innovation allowed it to enjoy a smooth transition 
at a greatly reduced cost compared to its rivals. 
 
In 2002 HP learned that the Europe’s Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
(WEEE) regulation would begin requiring hardware manufactures to pay for the cost of 
recycling products.  Knowing that the government sponsored recycling programs would 
be expensive, HP instead partnered with three other hardware manufacturers (Sony, 
Braun, and Electrolux) to create a private European Recycling Platform.  According to 
Nidumolu et al. (2009), in 2007 the platform worked with over 1,000 companies in 30 
countries to recycle approximately 20% of the material covered by the WEEE Directive.  
Furthermore, because of the platform’s scale it is able to charge almost 55% lower prices 
that its competitors and has saved HP $100 million from 2003 to 2007. 
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Finally, HP’s continued efforts to be on the forefront of innovation in the face of 
regulation has also allowed the company to become allies with regulators and shape 
many environmental regulations in Europe.  For example, in 2001 the European Union 
mandated that hardware manufacturers could no longer use hexavalent chromium as an 
anticorrosion coating their products.  HP, like many other manufacturers, felt the industry 
needed more time to develop alternatives, and was able to convince regulators to push 
back the ban one year (Nidumolu et al. 2002).  HP used this time to complete testing of 
organic and trivalent chromium coatings, as well as transfer this technology to more than 
one of its vendors.  Nidumolu et al. (2009) reports that as a result, vendors competed to 
supply the new coatings, which in turn lowered HP’s costs. 
 
HP’s case demonstrates that there must be strong economic incentives in order for 
regulation to foster successful innovation.  HP’s consistent success with innovation 
hinges on their ability to monetize their investments, mostly through cost cutting 
measures.  Therefore identifying environmental regulations that will encourage cost 
reductions, either through waste reduction or reducing the cost of inputs, will have a 
greater potential to foster innovation.  It is also important to note that, as in the case of 
GE Transportation, there was a strong international component to HP’s success with 
innovation.  This link reinforces the notion that in order for regulation to successfully 
foster innovation a similar level of standards must be present across countries. 
 
4.4 The Honda Civic 
 
The 1970 Federal Clean Air Act in the United States required a 90% reduction in 
automobile emissions.  Prior to 1969, end-of-pipe technologies, like catalytic converters, 
were thought to be the only means by which car companies could comply with emissions 
requirements.  Catalytic converters represented an additional cost to automakers and 
therefore caused Detroit firms to lobby against the new regulation due to fears of this 
regulation decreasing their competitiveness.  By ignoring possible innovations in 
technology, Detroit automakers grossly overestimated the cost of compliance as well as 
claimed that the new regulation made it impossible to meet both the emissions standards 
and the fuel economy standards that the government was imposing.   
 
Hwang & Peak (2006) detail how Honda was able to overcome this challenge with 
innovation.  Honda pursued other methods of emissions reduction, and encouraged by its 
founder, Soichiro Honda, the company attempted to clean up the exhaust gases inside of 
the engine itself without relying on catalytic converters.  This innovation led Honda 
engineers to utilize existing technologies in a way that produce a cleaner burning engine.  
The “Compound Vortex Controlled Combustion” (CVCC) engine that they created had a 
small pre-burn chamber before the cylinders, and this pre-burning resulted in more 
impurities being removed before they reached the tailpipe.  Hwang & Peak (2006) report 
that as a result, Honda was able to comply with the 1970’s regulation without the addition 
of catalytic converters.  Furthermore, the innovation proved to be additionally beneficial 
to Honda too, as each of the Detroit auto manufacturers licensed the technology from 
Honda in 1973.  
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Interestingly, during this same period other automakers were also pursuing some R&D 
projects of their own. However, their innovation was focused around end-of-pipe 
technologies, and for the major Detroit manufacturers their R&D efforts were only half-
hearted.  Gerard & Lave (2004) report that GM pursued the development of converter 
technology merely as a means to improve the company’s image in reaction to bad 
publicity in the 1960’s.  Similarly, they report that Ford’s R&D undertaking was little 
more than a front to avoid falling behind GM.  Finally, Gerard & Lave (2004) also point 
out that Chrysler in the meantime made no real effort to pursue any R&D in response to 
the threat of the 1970 Clean Air Act.  Yet when Chrylser failed to secure new technology 
from external suppliers, and failed to meet compliance with the new standards, it found 
itself at a huge disadvantage. As a result “the company was performing very poorly, 
losing unprecedented sums of money, and hurtling toward a massive government bailout 
by the end of the decade” (Gerard & Lave 2004, p. 770).  In all three cases, the lack of 
commitment to meaningful R&D projects to address new environmental regulation 
represents a major step backward in competitive advantage relative to Honda.  
 
Here it is interesting to note that the company that benefited most from domestic 
environmental regulation was, in fact, a foreign company competing in this market.  By 
recognizing the opportunity for innovation, Honda gained a first mover advantage in 
cleaner engine technologies, which became a valuable innovation in the face of 
increasing emissions requirements in the United States.  Honda benefited not only by 
reducing its own costs of compliance, but also by receiving revenue from the licensing of 
its technology to other competitors who had pursued failing R&D projects or none at all.  
Although this case study illustrates very well how regulation can induce innovation in an 
industry, it also illuminates the complicated dynamics that regulations have on 
international markets.  It can be argued that the environmental regulation imposed by the 
EPA by the 1970 Clean Air Act indeed did have adverse affects on the domestic 
automobile industry, because it allowed a foreign competitor to gain a competitive 
advantage.  In such a market, where international competitors already exist, it may be 
very difficult for the Porter Hypothesis to hold true given that foreign firms have equal 
opportunity to innovate in the face of regulation. Therefore, in order to craft regulation in 
such a way as to benefit domestic firms a mutual relationship must be developed between 
regulators and industry, in which industry is receptive and works constructively with 
regulators to address their needs and concerns. 
 
4.5 Peugeot SA 
 
Though all cars in the U.S. eventually had been outfitted with 3-way catalytic converters 
as of 1981, similar regulation in Europe developed much more slowly.  Sinclair-
Desgagne (1999) details how during this time Peugeot SA, a French carmaker, (as well as 
Ford Europe) pursued an alternative to the catalytic converter in what they called a “lean-
burn” engine.  Similar to the case of Honda in the face of the 1970s Clean Air Act, 
Peugeot SA was attempting to meet increasing emissions standards not with end-of-pipe 
technologies, but instead with innovation at the source of pollution.  The new design it 
was pursuing allowed engines to run on higher fuel/air ratios, thus reducing carbon and 
nitrogen oxide emissions. 
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Sinclair-Desgagne (1999) further explains that at the time that Peugeot SA was pursuing 
this innovation, the French government was behind other European countries in its 
emissions standards.  For example, at this time Germany, an important trade partner, had 
already adopted the catalytic converter standard.  As a result, the French government 
faced increasing pressure from environmental lobbies and other European countries to 
adopt stricter standards on car emissions. However, the French Government faced a 
tradeoff because Peugeot SA already had a head start on pursuing the development of a 
better technology, but due to Peugeot SA’s having just completed a difficult turnaround it 
would not be able to continue pursuing this development if forced to comply with stricter 
regulations.  Because Peugeot SA was one of France’s major employers, the government 
delayed compliance with many of the European standards for years, but was eventually 
forced enact stricter emissions standards.  According to Sinclair-Desgange (1999) this 
regulation in turn killed Peugot SA’s development efforts for the lean-burn engine, as the 
company no longer had an incentive to pursue this technological innovation when forced 
to utilize catalytic converters. 
 
In this example we see regulation having almost the exact opposite effect on innovation 
that the 1970’s Clean Air Act had on the Honda Civic.  In the case of Peugeot SA, the 
regulation that the firm faced served to discourage the pursuit of technological innovation 
because the regulation mandated the implementation of end-of-pipe technologies that 
were in direct opposition to the goals of innovation.  Therefore, it can be said that any 
regulation that hopes to encourage technological innovation must focus on broad based 
issues in pollution reduction, and not mandate specific technologies that firms must 
implement in pursuing compliance with these standards.  Finally, the fact that the French 
government consistently delayed environmental regulation and did not send a clear 
message of when stricter standards would be implemented likely resulted in Peugeot 
SA’s delay in completing its research for the lean-burn engine.  If Peugeot SA had been 
given a clearer timeline of when to expect stricter environmental regulation then the firm 
could have better planned its innovation efforts.  Here, delay in regulation produced the 
opposite of a first mover advantage for Peugeot SA, and therefore it is suggested that the 
timing of environmental regulation relative to other countries has a profound importance 




From these case studies we can identify the following five characteristic that 
environmental regulation should have in order to successfully encourage innovations in 
firms: 
 
(1) The regulation must not mandate specific “end-of-pipe” solutions, but rather 
should allow for individual firms to decide how to achieve compliance. 
(2) The regulation creates a market for new products that satisfy the need of all 
firms within an industry to meet more stringent levels of compliance. 
(3) The regulation inspires technological innovations that will have the ability to 
cut costs for firms in the future.  
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(4) The regulation provides the opportunity for increased revenues from licensing 
of new technologies used to meet compliance. 
(5) The regulation reduces the uncertainty of R&D investments by providing a 
clear timeline of when firms will be expected to meet the new levels of 
compliance. 
 




These case studies show that there is clear anecdotal evidence to support the notion that 
environmental regulation can successfully induce innovation in firms and lead to 
economic benefits.  The purpose of this section is to identify a mechanism through which 
environmental regulation provides this incentive and then to analyze firm behavior given 
this mechanism. 
 
In all the cases mentioned above, environmental regulation can be seen to provide 
economic incentives to affected firms under the condition that the regulation reduces the 
uncertainty of R&D projects; that is to say, the affected firms were able to perceive the 
ability to receive a return on their investment in innovative technologies.  This reduction 
in uncertainty allowed firms to undertake R&D projects that benefited them economically 




The economic incentives mentioned above appear as investments in R&D projects, which 
when successful provide the firm with a competitive advantage.  The success of an R&D 
project is determined by its ability to provide an increase in profitability that will 
compensate for the cost of undertaking the project.  Therefore, in light of environmental 
regulation a successful R&D project can be achieved in two ways:  
  
(1) The project will result in a reduction in marginal cost for the firm.  By 
lowering its marginal cost, a firm can achieve higher market share and thus 
higher profits.  Furthermore, if the innovation that results from the R&D 
project is truly revolutionary, the firm may even enjoy increased revenue from 
the licensing of this technology to competitors 
 
(2) The regulation will create public awareness about the environmental impacts 
of the firms operations.  The public awareness can be met with consumers’ 
increased demand for “green” technologies, as they perceive a greater benefit 
in these products over old, dirtier ones.  This outward shift in the demand 
curve would allow firms supplying cleaner products to charge a higher price 
for their products, and thus there would be a clear benefit for undertaking an 
R&D project that would satisfy this demand. 
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The following model will focus on examining the first scenario from above, considering 
marginal cost reductions and license fees.  However, it is clear from the case studies 
presented above that there are many complicated market dynamics that influence the 
success of an R&D project.  It is therefore necessary to consider the situation in which 
more than one firm may be induced to undertake R&D initiatives when faced with 
regulation.  In this scenario, firms must not only consider the uncertainty of their own 
proposed R&D projects but also must consider the possibility of their competitors 
achieving successful R&D projects as well.   
 
This consideration can lead to an R&D race, in which several firms compete to develop 
innovative technologies.  There will be two phases of this R&D race: (1) One firm will 
develop a successful technology, and (2) this technology will then be shared across firms 
in the industry.  The first firm to realize a successful R&D project will initially be the 
only one to realize the benefits of increased profits.  But as the technology is shared 
among firms, this R&D race will ultimately benefit the entire industry by allowing all 
firms to benefit from the new technology.  In the end all firms are better off, and enjoy 
lower costs and higher profits than before regulation.  However, there is a strong 
incentive to be the first company to develop this new technology in order to receive a 
competitive advantage over other firms before the industry catches up.  This competition 
will increase the likelihood of a firm completing a successful R&D project when faced 
with regulation, thus supporting and strengthening the connections between regulation 
and innovation. 
 
Furthermore, a major question that remains to be answered by this analysis is why 
environmental regulation is necessary in order to spur innovation decisions.  That is to 
say, if these R&D projects to develop new cost-saving technologies will lead to increased 
profitably for firms why would they not choose to invest in these projects anyway?  An 
appropriate answer to this question is central in developing support for the Porter 
Hypothesis, and as such this paper will focus in particular on parameters and cost 
structures that reflect price competition scenarios in which companies initially have 
equilibrium strategies to not invest in innovation but are then subsequently incentivized 
to do so by environmental regulation.  
 
5.3 Price Competition and the Innovation Decision 
 
In order to analyze the economic impact of environmental regulation on firms a simple 
price competition game will be simulated between two firms that sell homogeneous 
products.  Dixit and Skeath (2004) provide a model for price competition between two 
such firms, in which Firm 1 and Firm 2 must simultaneously choose a price (P1 and P2, 
respectively) at which to offer their products with the goal of profit maximization.  Here, 
price is considered to be a continuous variable and therefore can take on any value within 
an infinite range.  In this model a firm’s pricing decision affects profit through shifting 
demand as given by the following equations, where Q1 represents the demand for Firm 1 




Q1 = a – P1 + bP2 
Q2 = a – P2 + bP1 
 
Using these equations it can be seen that if Firm 1 increases its price it will have a 
negative impact on its own demand, while having a positive impact on Firm 2’s demand 
(through the substitution effect).  In this model the parameter a represents a ceiling for 
each firm’s demand and the parameter b controls for the magnitude of the substitution 
effect.  Furthermore, the parameter b is restricted to values between 0 and 1 (inclusive).  
Finally, the parameters a and b need not be symmetric for both firms, although they will 
be treated as such for the purposes of the following analyses. 
 
The profit for each firm is calculated as the product of the net revenue per unit (price 
minus cost) and the number of units sold (demand), or: 
 
Profit for Firm 1, !1 = (P1 – C1)(a – P1 + bP2) 
Profit for Firm 2,  !2 = (P2 – C2)(a – P2 + bP1) 
 
Where C1 and C2 represent the marginal cost of production for Firm 1 and Firm 2 
respectively.  The game is solved by establishing each firm’s best-response curve, which 
is then used to determine equilibrium prices.  These equilibrium prices are then used to 
calculate the resulting profit for each firm.  Firm 1’s best response (BR1), when faced 
with any P2, is to choose a P1 that maximizes its profit.  Therefore, 
 
BR1: d!1/dP1 = 0 
 
    !1 = (P1 – C1)(a – P1 + bP2) 
    !1 = -X1(a + bP2) + (a + bP2 + C1)P1 – P12 
    d!1/dP1 = a + bP2 +C1 – 2P1 
     0 = a + bP2 + C1 – 2P1 
     2P1 = a + bP2 + C1 
 
Because the profit curves of the two firms are symmetric in respect to the parameters a 
and b, Firm 2’s best response can be solved similarly, resulting in the following 
equations: 
 
BR1: P1 = (a + C1)/2 + (b/2)P2 
BR2: P2 = (a + C2)/2 + (b/2)P1 
 
This system of equations can be solved using substitution in order to find the Nash 
Equilibrium prices P1* & P2*, in general terms, which will result from this price 
competition. Such calculations for P2* are provided below, while P1* can be derived from 
symmetry. 
 
  P1 = (a + C1)/2 + (b/2)P2  
  P2 = (a + C2)/2 + (b/2)P1 
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   P2 = (a + C2)/2 + (b/2) [(a + C1)/2 + (b/2)P2] 
   P2 = (a + C2)/2 + (ab +bC1)/4 + (b2/4)P2 
   P2 (1 – (b2/4)) = (2a + 2C2 +ab + bC1)/4 
   P2 = (2a + 2C2 +ab + bC1) / (4 – b2) 
  
   P2* = [2(a + C2) + b(a + C1)]/ [(4 – b2)]                      (Eq. 1) 
   P1* = [2(a + C1) + b(a + C2)]/ [(4 – b2)]                      (Eq. 2) 
 
Although we have now solved for (in general terms) the equilibrium prices that result 
from this type of price competition, the Dixit and Skeath (2004) model must be 
augmented in order to consider the effects of environmental regulation and the resulting 
innovation decisions.  For the purposes of this analysis we will assume that a firm’s 
decision to innovate will lead to a reduction in that firm’s marginal cost, as supported by 
the case studies presented in Section 4.  Therefore, Firm 1 and Firm 2 will be playing a 
simultaneous move game that now effectively has two stages: (1) The firms must decide 
whether or not to invest in an R&D project that will serve to lower marginal cost, and (2) 
the firms must then choose a price for their products given the new cost structure that the 
firms will face.  In order to solve this game, each firm must now consider the profit it will 
achieve given the different combinations of investment decision outcomes and price 
structure possible (see Figure 1). 
 
   Investment Decisions 
 
  Firm 2 
  Invest Not Invest 
Invest ¢ ¢ ¢ C Firm 1 
Not Invest C ¢ C C 
 
Figure 1. Cost structures for various investment decision combinations, where C > ¢ > 0 and ¢ represents 
a decrease in the marginal cost of production for firms that choose to invest in new technology.   
Note: This does not represent a payoff matrix for the firms relative to investment decisions. 
 
Although this game is described as having two stages, for all intents and purposes the 
firms face only one simultaneous decision.  That is to say, in order to solve this game 
each firm will first analyze the resulting profit at each cost structure by determining the 
equilibrium prices in each scenario; then, by comparing the resulting profits the firms will 
make their investment decisions and reach an overall equilibrium.  In order to solve for 
equilibrium prices, and thus inform investment decisions, the firms must consider two 
scenarios: (1) When costs are symmetric, as in the case of the strategies (Invest, Invest) or 
(Not Invest, Not Invest), and (2) when costs are asymmetric, as in the case of (Invest, Not 
Invest) or (Not Invest, Invest). 
 
In the case of symmetric costs, the substitution C1 = C2 = C can be made Equation 1, 
which now becomes: 
   
P2* = [2(a + C) + b(a + C)]/ [(4 – b2)] 
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Furthermore, because both firms are symmetric about the parameters a and b as well, the 
above equation can be generalized for either Firm 1 or Firm 2.  Finally, this equation can 
then be simplified to determine the equilibrium price, P*, for both firms under symmetric 
cost conditions as follows: 
 
   P* = [2(a + C) + b(a + C)]/ [(4 – b2)] 
            P* = [2(a + C) + b(a + C)]/ [(2 + b)(2 – b)] 
   P* = [(2 + b)(a + C)]/[(2 + b)(2 – b)] 
 
    P* = (a + C)/(2 – b)     (Eq. 3) 
  
Therefore, under symmetric cost conditions the profit for each firm, !: 
 
  ! = (P* – C)(a – P* + bP*) 
  ! = -aC + (a + C – bC)P* + (b – 1)(P*)2   
  ! = -aC + (a + C – bC)[(a + C)/(2 – b)] + (b – 1)[(a + XC/(2 – b)]2 
      … 
   ! = [(a – C)2 + bC(bC + 2a – 2C)]/(2 – b)2 
 
In order to differentiate between the different levels of profit achieved in the two different 
instances of symmetric cost, an upper case pi, ", will denote the profit that is achieved by 
investing in technology in order to reduce marginal cost.  Therefore, the profit equations 
for symmetric cost are more accurately represented as: 
  
   !  = [(a – C)2 + bC(bC + 2a – 2C)]/(2 – b)2   (Eq. 4) 
   "  = [(a – ¢)2 + b¢ (b¢ + 2a – 2¢)]/(2 – b)2   (Eq. 5) 
 
In considering the case of asymmetric costs, the substitution C1 = C2 = C can no longer 
be made into Equations 1 & 2.  Therefore the equilibrium prices P1* and P2* must remain 
unique, and under these conditions the profit for Firm 1, !1 can be calculated as follows: 
 
  !1 = (P1* - C1)(a – P1* + bP2*) 
  !1 = -aC1 + (a + C1)P1* - bC1P2 + bP1*P2* - (P1*)2 
 
  substitute P1* & P2* from Eqs. 1 & 2, then simplify… 
 
!1 = [4a2 + 4a2b + 4abC2 + 4C12 – 4abC1 – 4bC1C2 – 4b2C12 + 2ab3C1 +  
 2b3C1C2 + b4C12 + 4ab2C1 +2ab2C2 + b2C22 – 8aC1 + a2b2] / (4 – b2)2 (Eq. 6) 
 
It follows then from symmetry that the profit for Firm 2, !2: 
 
!2 = [4a2 + 4a2b + 4abC1 + 4C22 – 4abC2 – 4bC1C2 – 4b2C22 + 2ab3C2 +  
 2b3C1C2 + b4C22 + 4ab2C2 +2ab2C1 + b2C12 – 8aC2 + a2b2] / (4 – b2)2  (Eq. 7) 
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Note: It would be more accurate to represent the different costs to the firms as C1 and ¢2 in the case when 
Firm 2 chooses to invest while Firm 1 does not and vice versa, but for simplicity the above equations can 
be used to represent profit in either case. 
 
Furthermore, just as in the case of symmetric costs, the symbols "1 and "2 will be used 
to denote the profit achieved by firms that choose to invest in technology that will reduce 
marginal cost, while !1 and !2 will be used to represent the profit of a firm that chooses 
not to invest.  Finally, in order to generate a payoff matrix that encompasses the total cost 
to each firm of choosing whether to invest in new technology there must be some fixed 
cost, F, associated with the decision to invest in new technology.  Therefore, the final 
payout matrix for this price-competition game is given in Figure 2. 
 
    Price Competition Payoff Matrix 
 
  Firm 2 
  Invest Not Invest 
Invest " - F " - F "1 - F !2 Firm 1 
Not Invest !1 "2 - F ! ! 
 
Figure 2. Total profit to be achieved by each firm in each of the cost structures outlined in Figure 1. ! 
represents  the profit achieved by choosing not to invest while " represents the profit achieved by choosing 
to invest, with F representing the fixed cost associated with R&D expenditures.   
Note: The subscripts serve to distinguish the different levels of profit achieved when firms face asymmetric 
costs, while no subscripts are needed to distinguish the profit achieved by firms facing symmetric costs. 
 
Using the above framework, two cases will now be considered which shed light on how 
environmental regulation can foster innovation in firms that would choose not to innovate 
otherwise.  First, this analysis will consider why some firms will choose not to undertake 
R&D projects that provide a net economic benefit to the firm because of risk aversion, 
and then show how environmental regulation can shift the game’s equilibrium to 
encourage investment.  Second, this analysis will consider how environmental regulation 
can be used to induce an R&D race that will lead to a net economic benefit to the winning 
firm through license fee revenues, even when such a project would not be financially 
attractive before regulation. 
 
In the following exercises payoff matrices will be presented in the same format as given 
in Figure 2, with profits calculated using Equations 4, 5, 6, and 7 and net profits 
calculated considering any fixed cost, F, or license fee, L.  The strategies of each firm, 
either Invest or Not Invest, will be indicated by underlining the corresponding payoff, and 
thus a Nash Equilibrium solution to each game will be any square which has both payoffs 
underlined. 
 
5.4 Exercise 1: Risk Aversion 
 
This exercise supports the argument that innovation resulting from environmental 
regulation serves to benefit firms economically by reducing their costs.  It further 
explains why firms would require environmental regulation in order to take advantage of 
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these investment opportunities, even though such projects would have provided net 
benefit to the firm anyway.  To begin this exercise, we must first construct a payoff 
matrix which has a Nash Equilibrium of (Invest, Invest), or in other words features 
parameters which make investing in R&D projects to develop new cost-saving 
technology financially attractive to firms.  The following parameters and resulting payoff 
matrix achieve this goal: 
 
    Payoff Matrix Encouraging R&D 
 a = 100 
 b = .5 
 C = 50  
 ¢ = 42.5  
 F =250 
 
Figure 3. Payoff matrix using parameters that result in a Nash Equilbirum of (Invest, Invest), meaning that 
under the cost structure defined by the given parameters the ensuing price competition would make 
investing in cost-saving technology economically beneficial to firms. 
 
Here, the parameters are chosen in order to reasonably represent real-world market 
conditions (i.e. fixed cost should be high relative to savings from marginal cost 
reductions and marginal cost reductions should be small relative to marginal cost).  
However, in order to suit our purposes of illustrating a financial advantage to investing in 
cost-saving technology, the marginal cost savings of the technology is chosen to be 15% 
and the fixed cost of the project is relatively low (investing $250 saves $7.25 in cost per 
unit).  Nevertheless, these parameters accurately reflect the type of financially attractive 
investments that the firms described in Section 4 likely faced. 
 
Given these attractive payoffs, a simple explanation for why firms will avoid investments 
in R&D to create new cost-saving technologies arises from the concept of risk aversion.  
Because there is inherent uncertainty in whether a firm’s R&D project will succeed in 
developing technology that will indeed benefit the firm, a firm may choose to avoid 
undertaking risky R&D projects even when such investments have projected net benefits.  
Thus, firms will discount the expected profits of uncertain projects according to their 
level of risk aversion, and more favorably value profits that can be achieved with 
certainty.   
 
For example, suppose that in undertaking an R&D project a firm has a fifty-percent 
chance of the project succeeding, in which case it earns $100 in extra profit, and a fifty-
percent chance of the project failing and earning $0 extra.  Next, suppose a firm scales 
the payoff (or utility) of its investments by square rooting the expected profit.  Under 
these conditions, the prospect of earning $100 is equal to a payoff of 5 to the firm (.5 x 
#100 + .5 x $0), which is exactly the same as the firm receiving $25 for certain (#25 = 5). 
 
Here the firm is characterized as risk averse, because it is willing to sacrifice the 
difference between the expected value of the investment, $50 (or .5 x 100 + .5 x 0), in 
order to receive $25 for certain.  Figure 4 provides a graph of this analysis of risk 
  Firm 2 
  Invest Not Invest 
Invest 2506 2506 2612 2401 Firm 1 Not Invest 2401 2612 2500 2500 
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aversion, showing the square root scaling of profits, the expected value of the investment, 
and the firm’s indifference between the certain profit and the investment prospect. 
 
Figure 4. Graph displaying a firm’s risk aversion, with the square-root scale shown in red, the expected 
value of the investment shown in black, and the indifference of the firm between the certain profit of $25 
and the fifty-fifty chance of $100 shown by the dashed line. 
 
This type of risk aversion to uncertain R&D project can be incorporated into the payoff 
matrix shown above, and can be used to explain how environmental regulation can foster 
innovation.  Suppose that the firms are facing the same parameters and payoff matrix as 
proposed in Figure 3, but also scale their payoffs by square rooting expected profits and 
additionally believe that the R&D project only has a fifty-percent chance of reducing 
their marginal cost.  A conceptual payoff matrix showing how the scaled payoffs are now 
calculated is shown below in Figure 5. 
 
Matrix Showing Calculations for Scaled Payoffs 
  Firm 2 
  Invest (I) Not Invest (NI) 
I p
2*#("-F) + p(1-p)*#("1-F) 
+ p(1-p)*#(!1-F) + (1-p)2*#(!-F) 
p2*#("-F) + p(1-p)*#("2-F) 
+ p(1-p)*#(!2-F) + (1-p)2*#(!-F) 
p*#("1 – F) 
+ (1-p)* #(! - F)  
p*#(!2) 




p*#(!1) + (1-p)*#(!) 
 
p*#("2 – F) 
+ (1-p)* #(! - F)  ! ! 
 
Figure 5. Payoff matrix demonstrating how to calculate the scaled payoffs for risk averse firms.  The 
parameter p represents the probability of an R&D project succeeding, while (1-p) represents the probability 
that it will fail. As in Figure 2, " is used to denote higher profit that is achieved through marginal cost 
reductions, while ! represents the lower level of profit that is achieved at the original level of marginal 
cost.  The subscripts serve to denote the profits achieved under asymmetric cost structures, while profit 
symbols without subscripts represent those achieved under symmetric cost structures (see Section 5.3).  
 
Using the calculations shown in Figure 5, the scaled payoffs that each firm will receive 
can now be analyzed to show how uncertainty in R&D projects can lead to a shift in the 
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equilibrium solution of the game presented in Figure 3 away from (Not Invest, Not 
Invest).  The scaled payoff matrix reflecting these conditions is shown in Figure 6. 
 





success = .5 
 
 
Figure 6. Payoff matrix using the same parameters as in Figure 3 but scaled to show a risk aversion.  Here 
the firms’ payoffs are calculated by square rooting the expected profits to be received if each firm has fifty-
percent chance of its R&D project reducing its costs.  Under these conditions the Nash Equilibrium shifts to 
(Not Invest, Not Invest). 
 
Each firm’s risk aversion has shifted the Nash Equilibrium of this scaled payoff matrix to 
(Not Invest, Not Invest), which is preventing them from receiving the net benefit provided 
by investing in R&D, as shown in Figure 3.  It is important to realize that the numbers in 
the scaled payoff matrix in Figure 5 do not represent the actual expected profit that each 
firm will realize, but rather is a representation of the payoff or utility that the firms will 
receive from making decisions about uncertain investments in new R&D projects.  For 
this reason, the firms will choose their strategies of Not Invest based on this scaled payoff 
matrix, even though they understand that investing could potentially provide them with a 
net increase in profits. 
 
This outcome can be changed however by the influence of environmental regulation.  As 
Porter and van der Linde point out, regulation can serve to, “signal companies about 
resource inefficiencies & potential technological improvements,” as well as, “reduce 
uncertainty that investments to address the environment will be valuable” (Porter and van 
der Linde 1995, pp. 99-100).  More specifically, by attaching a new cost to certain 
resources, properly crafted environmental regulation can send signals to companies that 
investing in R&D projects focused on creating new technologies that will reduce inputs 
of these costly resources will have a higher probability of saving the company money.  
Therefore, environmental regulation can effectively cause companies to assign higher 
probabilities of success to R&D projects. 
 
As seen in Figure 7, an increase in the probability of success to seventy percent results in 
a shift in the Nash Equilibrium of this game to induce firms to begin investing in R&D.  
At this level, the equilibria become (Invest, Not Invest) and (Not Invest, Invest), which 
although they affect the firms’ payoffs unequally still result in higher combined profit for 
the two firms (see Figure 3). Furthermore, Figure 6 also shows that another increase in 
the probability of success to just seventy-one percent results in the more favorable 





  Firm 2 
  Invest Not Invest 
Invest 48.75 48.75 49.27 49.5 Firm 1 Not Invest 49.5 49.27 50 50 
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success = .71 
 
 
Figure 7. Payoff matrix reflecting the increased probability of success afforded by environmental 
regulation.  In both cases, the Nash Equilibria have shifted to away from (Not Invest, Not Invest) 
demonstrating how environmental regulation can be effective in inducing innovation. 
 
5.5 Exercise 2: Licensing Fees 
 
This exercise supports the argument that innovation resulting from environmental 
regulation serves to benefit firms economically by providing additional revenues from 
license fees.  It further explains why firms would require environmental regulation in 
order to take advantage of licensing fees, because the regulation creates a market for new 
products that satisfy the need of all firms within an industry to meet more stringent levels 
of compliance.   
 
For this exercise we must first construct a matrix which results in the Nash Equilibrium 
strategies (Not Invest, Not Invest), indicating that investing in a certain type of R&D 
project to reduce cost is not initially financially attractive to either firm.  Furthermore, the 
parameters chosen should again reasonably represent real-world conditions (i.e. fixed 
cost should be high relative to savings from marginal cost reductions, marginal cost 
reductions should be small relative to marginal cost, and the substitution effect should not 
be one to one).  Figure 8 provides a set of parameters and the resulting payoff matrix that 
would discourage firms from investing in new technology. 
 
 License Fee Payoff Matrix – Before Environmental Regulation 
 a = 100 
 b = .5 
 C = 50  
 ¢ = 45  
 F = 300 
                  L = 0       
Figure 8. Payoff matrix constructed to demonstrate conditions in which it would not be financially 
beneficial for a firm to invest in cost-saving technology before the introduction of license fees. 
 
As shown above, under these conditions the dominant strategy for both firms is to choose 
Not Invest.  Although the investment in R&D to develop new technology reduces a firm’s 
cost by 10%, the high fixed cost of the investment makes the decision economically 
  Firm 2 
  Invest Not Invest 
Invest 49.27 49.27 50.01 49.30 Firm 1 Not Invest 49.30 50.01 50 50 
  Firm 2 
  Invest Not Invest 
Invest 49.30 49.30 50.04 49.29 Firm 1 Not Invest 49.29 50.04 50 50 
  Firm 2 
  Invest Not Invest 
Invest 2369 2369 2439 2434 Firm 1 Not Invest 2434 2439 2500 2500 
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unattractive.  Furthermore, because the firm that chooses not to invest in R&D does not 
have access to the newly developed technology it cannot benefit from reducing its 
marginal cost either.  Under these conditions innovation diminishes the overall profit of 
the market, and the firms perform best when they choose not in invest in new, cost-saving 
technology. 
 
However, using the same parameters as above it can be shown that environmental 
regulation has the ability to shift the Nash Equilibrium in this game and improve overall 
profits by introducing revenues from a license fee.  Because environmental regulation 
would mandate compliance, a firm that chooses not to innovate would have to pay a fee 
in order to license the new technology from the other firm that has developed technology 
to meet the new standards.  Here, the license fee would not only be a reward for the firm 
that chooses to invest in R&D in order to develop new technology, but would also be a 
punishment for the firm that chooses not to invest. 
 
For the purposes of this analysis, the license fee, L, will be considered as a lump sum 
payment that one firm must pay to the other in order to have access to the newly 
developed technology.  Because the firm is paying the license fee in order to obtain 
access to the new, cost-saving technology it will benefit from reducing its marginal cost.  
Finally, if both firms choose to invest neither will benefit from receiving a license fee 
because each already has access to the required technology. As such, the payoff matrix 
will take on the new characteristics shown below in Figure 9. 
 
Price Competition Payoff Matrix with License Fee 
 
  Firm 2 
  Invest Not Invest 
Invest " - F  " - F " – F + L " - L Firm 1 
Not Invest " - L " - F + L ! ! 
 
Figure 9. Total profit to be achieved by each firm with the advent of license fees.  Because licensing allows 
for the transfer of technology between firms, firms will face symmetric cost structures when at least one 
firm invests in R&D, and will also achieve higher profits, ", due to marginal-cost savings.   
 
Figure 10 provides three payoff matrices, using the same parameters as in Figure 7 and a 
range of license fee values, which show critical values of L (such that 0 < L < F) that 
shift the Nash Equilibrium away from (Not Invest, Not Invest).  From these payoff 
matrices it can be seen for that any L such that 0 < L < 130.555… the Nash Equilibrium 
of the game remains (Not Invest, Not Invest).  However, for values of L such that 
130.555… < L < 300 the Nash Equilibrium of the game is either (Invest, Not Invest) or 
vice versa.  Finally, as the value of the license fee increases above 300, or the value of F, 
the Nash Equilibrium will shift to (Invest, Invest). Therefore, all values of L greater than 
or equal to 130.555… represent the success of environmental regulation in encouraging 





License Fee Payoff Matrices – Critical Values of L  
 
L = 130.555…  
  Firm 2 
  Invest Not Invest 
Invest 2369 2369 2500 2539 Firm 1 
Not Invest 2539 2500 2500 2500 
 
L = 150   
  Firm 2 
  Invest Not Invest 
Invest 2369 2369 2519 2519 Firm 1 
Not Invest 2519 2519 2500 2500 
 
L = 300   
  Firm 2 
  Invest Not Invest 
Invest 2369 2369 2669 2369 Firm 1 Not Invest 2369 2669 2500 2500 
 
Figure 10. Payoff matrices demonstrating the effect of license fee payments on equilibrium strategies.  As 
the value of the license fee increases from zero firms are incetivized to undertake investments in new, cost-
saving technology. 
 
Because regulation is not necessarily a prerequisite for firms to share technology among 
competitors, there is some question as to why regulation would be necessary in order to 
induce licensing when there are clear benefits even at low levels of license fees.  
However, when 130.555… < L < 150, although the firms have equilibrium strategies of 
(Invest, Not Invest) and vice versa, the firm that employs the strategy Not Invest actually 
realizes a higher profit.  That is, although the revenue from the license fee is high enough 
to encourage innovation it is not sufficiently high enough to reward the firm that chooses 
to invest in R&D more that the other firm who simply licenses the cost-saving 
technology.  Under these conditions, it is unrealistic that any firm would move away from 
the equilibrium of (Not Invest, Not Invest).   
 
Therefore, environmental regulation becomes an important incentive in allowing firms to 
shift away from this equilibrium.  Because the government is mandating compliance, at 
least one firm must invest in order to develop new technology.  As such, this requirement 
induces an R&D race in which one firm will choose to invest in the new technology and 
thus shift the equilibrium away from (Not Invest, Not Invest).  Furthermore, in order to 
properly incentivize R&D investments, environmental regulation is required in order to 
guarantee sufficiently high values of L that will provide a greater benefit to firms that 
choose to invest.  Once license fees become valued higher than 150, or half the cost of F, 
then the firm that chooses the strategy to invest enjoys a greater benefit than the firm that 
must license the technology, a condition that more accurately reflects the benefits of 
licensing as described in Section 4. 
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Environmental regulation can guarantee higher valuation of licenses for the sharing of 
technology across an industry in much the same way that it reduces uncertainty in R&D 
investments in new, cost-saving technology.  By signaling to companies that certain 
inputs will become more expensive the regulation will create a higher demand for new 
technologies that will reduce the need for these inputs and thus save companies money.  
This increased demand will result in a firm’s willingness to pay a higher price in order to 
access new technologies.  
 
Finally, it is important to note that for values of L above 130.555… (or roughly 43.5% of 
the fixed cost of investing) when one firm is incentivized to spend on R&D, the joint 
profit earned by the firms after innovation will be higher than the total profit realized 
before environmental regulation fostered this shift in the equilibrium.  This is due to the 
fact that ability to transfer technology between firms as a result of licensing allows for 
both firms to benefit from cost-saving technologies without both firms having to invest 
the full fixed cost of the technology, F.  The licensing fee effectively distributes the fixed 
cost of R&D among more than one firm, allowing the investment to become profitable 
and allowing all firms within a given market to reduce their marginal cost. 
 
At first the high values of L needed to make environmental regulation beneficial may 
seem like an unrealistic amount for one firm to charge another in order to license a newly 
developed technology.  However, as the number of firms in the market increases this total 
revenue from license fees can be divided among several competitors. Thus the individual 
penalty becomes more reasonable, while the aggregate revenue is more likely to exceed 
this critical value.  Therefore, a greater number of firms competing in a given market 
would increase the likelihood of success of environmental regulation, as the revenue of 





Although the exercises here have successfully demonstrated two ways in which 
environmental regulation can have a beneficial impact on innovation decisions, these 
mechanisms are by no means the only ones that can be explored using this price 
competition model.  For example, in the case of GE Transportation much of the success 
that resulted from developing a new, more efficient diesel locomotive came in the form 
of increased demand for a “green” product.  Using this same model of price competition 
between two firms, one could easily explore this mechanism through the manipulation of 
the parameters a and b, which respectively represent demand and the substitution effect, 
in order to demonstrate how an increase in demand as a result of environmental 








6  Conclusion 
 
Using a simple model of price competition between two firms it has been shown that 
environmental regulation can effectively induce innovation through spending on R&D 
projects to develop more efficient technology.  This technology lowers the firm’s costs by 
reducing the consumption of resources used as inputs.  The innovation described here 
provides firms with a net benefit by sufficiently increasing profits to overcome the cost of 
investing, while simultaneously benefiting the consumer through reduction of the 
negative externalities associated with the production of goods.  However, these benefits 
are only realized with the introduction of environmental regulation, because regulation is 
necessary in order to reduce uncertainty in R&D investments or to provide additional 
revenue in the form of licensing fees paid out to share technologies across an industry.  
Therefore, as a result of environmental regulation firms are incentivized to participate in 
investment decisions that they would not have otherwise, and as a result the firm, the 
industry, and the consumer benefit. 
 
Although the exercises presented here are obviously constructed to suit the purpose of 
supporting the Porter Hypothesis they are nevertheless worthwhile in modeling firm 
behavior that is representative of real-world conditions.  This analysis highlights risk 
aversion as a major shortcoming in firm behavior that prevents them from effectively 
identifying profitable investment opportunities.  Due to this limitation, there are likely a 
significant number of investment opportunities available to companies right now that are 
not being taken advantage of.  Despite this fact, we see a small number of firms, as 
demonstrated by the case of HP, that are willing to explore these opportunities.  HP has 
provided clear evidence to show that these investments have simultaneously benefited the 
firm through cost-saving measures and reduced the environmental impact of their 
business.  That a company like HP pursues these opportunities without being forced by 
the hand of regulation stems from a unique management strategy and company culture.  
Therefore, regulation is necessary in order to spread this strategy to a greater number of 
firms and a greater number of industries. 
 
Furthermore, this analysis also indicates that there are likely an equal number of 
investment opportunities being consider by companies now that simply do not provide 
the financial incentives necessary to spend money in order to create more efficient 
technologies.  In the case of GE Transportation and the Honda Civic, expensive projects 
to redesign engines would likely not have been pursued without the presence of more 
stringent regulation.  However, this analysis has demonstrated that if environmental 
regulation can begin to effectively guarantee a sufficiently high value for new 
technologies then firms can more consistently realize net benefits through technology 
sharing and licensing revenues just as GE and Honda have done.  Therefore, by better 
understanding how environmental regulation will impact market dynamics, especially 
through the advent of licensing fees, environmental regulation can be used to make these 
once unprofitable investments more financially attractive, benefiting the firm, the 
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